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ABSTRACT. Under current bankruptcy law, a leveraged buyout (LBO) that leaves an
acquired company insolvent, undercapitalized, or unlikely to be able to pay back its debts may be
later avoided as a fraudulent transfer. This regime, intended to protect the target's creditors,
requires a post-hoc valuation of the target long after the buyout and suffers from a number of
practical, procedural, and policy problems. This Note proposes an alternative regime to supplant
constructive fraudulent transfer litigation: an ex ante review of the proposed LBO by a neutral,
third-party appraiser. This proposal ameliorates many difficulties inherent in the current regime.
AUTHO R. Yale Law School, J.D. 2014. I would like to thank Richard Squire, Ted Janger, and
Roberta Romano for their assistance in developing my Note. I'm also deeply grateful to Matt
Letten, who provided indispensable critiques as a YLJ editor, and to Ryan McCartney for his




I. OVERVIEW OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
LAW 1834
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT REGIME 1839
A. The Impact of FTL on the LBO Market 1839
B. The Problem of Free Insurance 1842
C. Reduced Monitoring Incentives 1844
D. Difficult Post-Hoc Valuations 1845
E. Hindsight Bias 1848
F. Litigation Costs 1849
G. Inadequate Remedy 1850
H. Ex Ante Uncertainty 1852
III. PROPOSAL FOR EX ANTE REVIEW 1852
A. Implementation 1853
B. Procedural Details 1855
IV. ADVANTAGES OF EX ANTE REVIEW 1858
A. Hindsight Bias 1858
B. Improved Valuation 1859
C. Discrimination Between LBOs that Will Fail the Standards of Financial
Distress and LBOs that Will Pass Them 1859
D. Sharing the Benefits of an LBO: Turning Kaldor-Hicks-Optimal Buyouts
into Pareto-Optimal Buyouts 1861
E. Risk Sharing and Monitoring Incentives 1863
F. Remedy and Costs 1863
G. Assimilation of Fraudulent Transfer Law into Fraud Tort Law 1863
V. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF EX ANTE REVIEW 1864
A. Why Don't Creditors Just Protect Themselves? 1864
B. Type I Errors in Ex Ante Review 1867
1831
C. Information and Transaction Costs 1869
D. Restricting Market Forces 1870
E. Bad Faith Objections and Disclosure Timing 1871
F. Risk Externalities and Imperfect Adjusters 1871
CONCLUSION 1872
1832
EX ANTE REVIEW OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Kohlberg Kravis bought RJR Nabisco for $24 billion, using $19
billion in debt guaranteed by RJR Nabisco.' At the time, it was the largest
leveraged buyout (LBO) in history.' After struggling to meet its debt burden
for a decade,' RJR Nabisco was eventually broken up, and a large piece was
sold off in 1999.4 In 2003, it announced it would cut forty percent of its
workforce and reduce its scope to just two brands.'
The financial community generally agrees that the massive debt load
incurred in the LBO precipitated or at least accelerated the failure of RJR
Nabisco.6 Under current bankruptcy law, LBOs that eventually lead to
bankruptcy may later be challenged and partially unwound as fraudulent
transfers (sometimes called "fraudulent conveyances"). Such ex post review of
buyouts seeks to determine whether, at the time of the transaction, the buyout
left the target meeting any one of three standards of financial distress.7
In short, ex post review asks whether the buyout was doomed to fail from
the start.
Reviewing the LBO months or years after the transaction entails a number
of problems, including hindsight bias, free insurance for creditors, misaligned
monitoring incentives, and heavy litigation costs. This Note proposes a new
solution: review LBOs for potential problems before the buyout takes place,
rather than after the damage has already been done. I propose that LBOs be
analyzed in much the same way and by the same standards of financial distress
used in the current regime, but only at an earlier time. This would substantially
ameliorate many of the problems with the current fraudulent transfer law
(FTL) regime.
1. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
2. Stephen Grocer, Tracking the World's Biggest Buyouts, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2007, http://
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-buyoutso7O4.html.
3. Id.
4. Bryan Burrough, RJR Nabisco, an Epilogue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, http://www
.nytimes.com/1999/o3/12/opinion/rjr-nabisco-an-epilogue.html.
5. John Helyar, RJR Goes from Ashes to Ashes: How a 15-Year-Old LBO Still Haunts a Once-
Mighty Brand, CNN MONEY (Oct. 13, 2003), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune
/fortune archive/2003/10/13/35o888.
6. See, e.g., Burrough, supra note 4; Nancy W. Graml, Bondholder Rights in Leveraged Buyouts in
the Aftermath ofMetropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 1-2
(19i); Grocer, supra note 2; Helyar, supra note 5.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
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This Note will begin with an overview of current FTL and how it applies to
LBOs. It will then explore some of the problems with this current regime
before proposing a new regime of ex ante review and detailing its
implementation and procedure. Finally, it will detail some of the benefits of ex
ante review and explore some possible criticisms of the proposed regime.
1. OVERVIEW OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER LAW
An LBO is the acquisition of a target company financed by debt that is
secured by the assets of the target company and paid with the target's future
cash flows. 8 Put more simply: The acquiring company borrows money from
the lending bank to purchase the target company. That loan is secured by the
target's assets and future cash flows. The acquirer might also use some of its
own capital for the purchase along with the borrowed funds.' The acquirer
then uses these funds to buy the target from the target's current shareholders,
often at a large premium, and the acquirer becomes the new owner.
The transaction leaves the target with a highly leveraged (or debt-heavy)
capital structure, often close to a ninety percent debt-to-equity ratio."o Higher
leverage generally disadvantages debt holders because it increases the risk that
a firm will go into bankruptcy." The transaction, then, may be harmful to the
existing, unsecured creditors of the target, who gained nothing from the
transaction but saw the value of their debt decrease as the risk associated with
that debt increased.
The existing creditors face a real loss if the LBO is a failure and the highly
leveraged target does in fact go into bankruptcy. In that case, the former
shareholders lose nothing-they have already sold their interest in the
company. But the unsecured creditors have to stand in line behind the secured
lender in order to get their money.' Since the lender has a lien on all of the
target's assets, there will be few (if any) unsecured assets left for the unsecured
creditors to share.
8. STEPHEN A. Ross, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE 905-
o6 (9th ed. 2010).
g. Id.
1o. Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, in
FoUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 194, 194 (Roberta Romano ed., 2d ed. 2010).
ii. ROSS ET AL., supra note 8, at 520.
n.1 U.S.C. § u129 (b)(i).
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The transaction looks a lot worse if the target was close to bankruptcy at
the time of the LBO. The Bankruptcy Code uses an absolute priority rule to
establish the order in which stakeholders receive money when a company goes
bankrupt." By this absolute priority rule, shareholders can get money only
after creditors have been paid in full. The failed LBO described above subverts
the absolute priority rule. It allows the shareholders to cash out in full-at a
premium, no less - at the time of the acquisition, while the creditors get paid -
if they get paid at all-months after the acquisition when the company finally
enters bankruptcy.
Certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code protect creditors against just
such a transaction. FTL provides that if shortly before bankruptcy a debtor in
financial distress gives away assets and does not get reasonable value in return,
creditors can have that transaction avoided by the bankruptcy court.'4 These
fraudulent transfer provisions have been applied to LBOs to avoid the lien that
the target gave to the lender to finance the buyout."s If the lien is avoided in
bankruptcy, the lender must stand in line with the unsecured creditors, or in
some cases behind them, to get its money back from the bankrupt target. 6
FTL applies to many fraudulent transactions and is not specific to LBOs. It
applies to any fraudulent transaction that took place during or shortly before
the debtor went into bankruptcy. Imagine an individual who, facing
bankruptcy, knows her assets will soon be taken from her and divided up
13. Id. § 1129(b) (2).
14 Id- §§ 548, 550.
15. See, e.g., Boyer v. Crown Stock Distrib., Inc., 587 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2009); In re Iridium
Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007); Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d
1056 (3d Cir. 1992); Lippi v. City Bank, 955 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992); Mellon Bank, N.A. v.
Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991); Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9 th Cir.
1988); United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cit. 1986); Zahn v.
Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656 (D.R.I. 1998); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein,
94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Fed. Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal.
1985); In re Charter Conmc'ns, 419 B.R. 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Bay Plastics,
Inc., 187 B.R. 315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re O'Day Corp., 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); In re Revco D.S.,
Inc., 118 B.R. 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc., 1oo B.R.
127 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re Ohio Corrugating Co., 91 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1988).
16. 11 U.S.C. 5 1129 (b)(1). Again, the absolute priority rule will dictate that unsecured creditors
share equally in the recovery. If the bank's lien has been equitably subordinated, the bank
will stand behind the unsecured creditors.
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amongst her creditors. She might be tempted to give away some assets -to a
friend or relative, perhaps with the intention of later getting them back- before
she actually files bankruptcy. This hurts her creditors, because it means there
will be fewer assets left to satisfy her debts after she files for bankruptcy.
FTL prohibits such transactions made before or during bankruptcy or
creditor workouts." It provides for actions to avoid the fraudulent transfer and
to recover the transferred property for the benefit of the debtor's estate. 8 FTL
is codified in the Bankruptcy Code and in various state statutes, many of which
incorporate the language of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. In defining
fraudulent transfers, these statutes distinguish between actual and constructive
fraudulent transfers based on the debtor's intent.19 An actually fraudulent
transfer is similar to the scenario described for the debtor above: a transfer
made or obligation incurred by a debtor with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud its creditors." A constructively fraudulent transfer hurts creditors in
the same way as an actually fraudulent transfer- it reduces the assets available
for distribution to creditors - but does not involve fraudulent intent on the part
of the debtor. Such conveyances are defined as a transfer made or obligation
incurred by the debtor without receipt of reasonably equivalent value and that
either (i) leaves the debtor with unreasonably small capital, (2) creates a
reasonable expectation that the debtor will be unable to pay its debts as they
come due, or (3) is completed at a time when the debtor is insolvent or which
leaves the debtor insolvent as a result.' The Bankruptcy Code includes
additional provisions for fraudulent transfers to or for the benefit of insiders,
which are outside the scope of this Note's analysis.'
If a transaction meets the definition of actual or constructive fraudulent
transfer, that transaction may be avoided under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
or under state law as permitted by § 544,' and the fraudulently transferred
property or the value of such property may be recovered under § 550.2
Now I will return to the context of leveraged buyouts. The transactions
involved in a failed LBO sometimes satisfy the definition of fraudulent transfer.
17. Id. § 548; UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERAcT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
is. 11 U.S.C. 5 550.
ig. Id. S 548; UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Act § 4.
20. 11 U.S.C. S 548(a)(1)(A); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERACT 5 4(a)(1).
21. 11 U.S.C. 5 548(a)(1)(B); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT S 4(a)(2).
22. 11 U.S.C. 5 548(a) (i) (B)(ii) (IV).
23. Id. 5 544(b)(i).
24. Id. 5 55o(a).
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The target is the eventually-bankrupt debtor, and the transfer we care about is
the lien on the target's assets given to the lender, who is financing the LBO. In
return for this lien, the lender gives capital. It lends that capital, however, not
to the target, but to the acquirer, which then uses that capital to buy out the
target's selling shareholders. Here's the key: the target receives nothing in
return for issuing debt and granting a lien on its assets. And this is what makes
a fraudulent transfer. The debtor gave away value (in the form of a lien)
shortly before bankruptcy, thus hurting its creditors by reducing the assets
available to satisfy its debts.
Proving fraudulent intent in such a transaction is difficult. The existing
creditors would have to show that the selling shareholders conspired with the
acquiring company to defraud the target's creditors. For this reason, most
fraudulent transfer claims in the context of a failed LBO allege a constructive,
rather than intentional, fraudulent transfer. 25
To meet the definition of a constructive fraudulent transfer, the lien
granted by the target to the lending bank must satisfy both prongs of
constructive fraud. First, the debtor must have "received less than a reasonably
equivalent value."6 Recall that the target receives nothing in return for taking
on new debt and granting a lien on its assets. Even if we collapse the steps of
the transaction, the target still never sees the cash: we can follow the money
from bank lender to the acquirer, and then to the selling shareholders when the
acquirer buys out the stock of the target. In effect, the target is buying back its
own stock- replacing equity with debt on its balance sheet. The target gets its
own treasury stock, which is itself of no value to that company. While some
courts have recognized that an LBO may give the target reasonably equivalent
value in the form of indirect benefits, such as "the ability to obtain substantial
credit" or "the synergy expected to result from the combination," such a
finding is the exception and not the rule; courts generally agree that the
transfer of a lien in an LBO gives the target no reasonably equivalent value.29
25. See, e.g., Boyer v. Crown Stock Distrib., Inc., 587 F.3 d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009); Credit
Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Fed. Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 182 (C.D. Cal. 1985); In re Best
Prods. Co., 168 B.R. aS, 6o (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
z6. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(i)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
27. "A transaction by which a corporation acquires its own stock from a stockholder for a sum
of money is not really a sale. The corporation does not acquire anything of value equivalent
to the depletion of its assets, if the stock is held in the treasury, as in this case." Robinson v.
Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756, 757 (Sth Cir. 1935).
28. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647 (3d Cir. 1991).
29. See Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 500 (N.D. Ill. 1988); In re Ohio
Corrugating Co., 91 B.R. 430,435 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
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For this reason, an LBO will nearly always satisfy this first prong of the
constructive fraudulent transfer definition.30
The second prong of constructive fraud requires that the LBO meet one of
three standards of financial distress.3 ' Again, the LBO either (1) left the target
company with unreasonably small capital, (2) created the reasonable
expectation that the target would not be able to pay its debts as they came due,
or (3) was completed at a time when the target company was insolvent, or left
the target insolvent as a result of the LBO.' Satisfying one of these three
standards requires a determination of the target company's value at the time of
the LBO to determine its then-solvency and then-liquidity. The creditors
trying to avoid the fraudulent transfer attempt to show that the LBO was
doomed to financial failure from the start; the acquiring company and
the lending bank try to show that the LBO was in fact financially sound at
the start.
Since the first prong of the fraudulent transfer definition (no reasonably
equivalent value) is essentially met by default, it is this second prong-
evaluation of financial distress - that is the subject of costly ex post analysis
during fraudulent transfer litigation. This is the review that I argue would be
better undertaken before the LBO is finalized, rather than months after. When
the LBO is proposed, we should ask then whether it is financially sound.
We should not ask, months after the LBO failed, if it seemed like a good idea at
the time.
If the fraudulent transfer action is successful, the trustee avoids the transfer
under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. In the case of an LBO, this means that the
lending bank loses its lien on the assets of the now-bankrupt target and stands
in line with the other unsecured creditors for its share of the bankruptcy
estate." The court will sometimes grant other equitable remedies, discussed
belowm such as subordinating the bank to the other creditors.3 s Section 550
additionally allows for the recovery of the property or value of property
3o. See Wieboldt Stores, 94 B.R. at Soo; Ohio Corrugating Co., 91 B.R. at 435. But see Mellon Bank,
945 F.2d at 647 (noting that synergies resulting from the acquisition may constitute
reasonably equivalent value).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(i)(B)(ii).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores, 94 B.R. at soo.
34. See infra Section II.G (explaining why these remedies are inadequate).
35. See, e.g., In re O'Day Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); In re
Crowthers McCall Pattern Inc., 120 B.R. 279 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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fraudulently transferred.36 In the case of an LBO, § 550 can sometimes be used
to recover funds transferred to the target's selling shareholders.'
11. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT REGIME
Attempting to evaluate an LBO months or even years after the transaction
took place involves practical, logistical, and empirical difficulties, and also
raises policy concerns, which include the risk of misaligning incentives. Over
the last three decades, academics have explored many of these issues in
critiques of the current regime. I will survey the problems most commonly
discussed in the literature, as well as note others that ex ante review seeks to
address.
A. The Impact ofFTL on the LBO Market
FTL has a clear impact on the market for LBOs: it poses the danger that the
transaction may later be unwound in a bankruptcy proceeding. Academics who
believe that LBOs are value-creating tools criticize the current FTL regime as
unfairly deterring buyouts with the threat of ex post litigation.
Indeed, the first wave of literature on this topic addressed the question of
whether FTL should be applied to LBOs at all." The seminal work in this
debate was Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson's 1985 article Fraudulent
Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, which argues vehemently that FTL
should not be applied to LBOs. 9 Baird and Jackson raise a number of
36. 11 U.S.C. § 550.
37. See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores, 94 B.R. at 488.
38. For articles opposing the application of fraudulent conveyance law to LBOs, see Douglas G.
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 829 (1985); and Robert J. White, Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Conveyance Laws
Under the Bankruptcy Code-Like Oil and Water, They Just Don't Mix, 1991 ANN. SuRv. AM. L.
357. For articles supporting its application, see William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt
Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92; Barry L. Zaretsky,
Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165 (1995);
Raymond J. Blackwood, Note, Applying Fraudulent Conveyance Law to Leveraged Buyouts, 42
DUKE L.J. 340 (1992); and Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged
Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1987). But see Jenny B. Wahl & Edward T. Wahl,
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts: Remedy or Insurance Policy?, 16 WM.
MITcHELL L. REV. 343 (1990).
39. Baird & Jackson, supra note 38.
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concerns, chief among them that these laws give creditors a sort of free
insurance against the later failure of a buyout.4 o They further assert that LBOs
are not necessarily harmful to pre-existing creditors. 1 In fact, they present a
number of potential benefits accruing to creditors, including a more streamlined
and efficient debtor, often with greater access to capital (through its new
owner, in the case of a merger) than before the LBO." In the case of an LBO in
which the target is bought from public shareholders and taken private by
the purchasers, the debtor-target is saved expenses by avoiding federal
securities laws.4
Empirical studies have borne out these claims of the increased value of the
debtor after a successful LBO.4 More generally, LBOs facilitate the market for
corporate control, disciplining management not only of the corporations that
do become the target of a buyout, but also of those functioning under the
threat of such a takeover.4s Because a leveraged transaction allows the buyer to
acquire the target without first amassing a large reserve of capital, more buyers
can enter the market, putting more potential targets into play. Buyouts are also
socially efficient when an acquiring company experiences synergistic gains with
the acquired target.46
Other academics share Baird and Jackson's point of view; Barry Zaretsky
interprets the Third Circuit's decision in Mellon Bank (in which the court
recognized synergistic gains to the debtor as reasonably equivalent value) as a
recognition that "risk does not necessarily increase in direct proportion to the
obligation undertaken by the debtor."" An LBO could help existing creditors if
the target was in poor financial health to begin with. If bonds were already
trading at a substantial discount due to the debtor's risk of insolvency, the LBO
4o. Id. at 840 ("If creditors always can undo transactions afterwards, they have every incentive
to wait and upset only those transactions that turn out unfavorably from their
perspective.").
41. Id. at 833 ("It is not clear that permitting the debtor to engage in a leveraged buyout, for
instance, is against the long-term interests of the creditors as a group.").
42. Id. at 853.
43. Id.
44. Steven N. Kaplan, Sources of Value in Management Buyouts, in LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT
BUvOUTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 95, 95-1oo (Yakov Amihud ed., 2002).
45. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE LAw, supra note 1o, at 491, 492.
46. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc'ns, Inc., 94 5 F.2d 635, 647-48 (3d Cir. 1991).
47. Zaretsky, supra note 38, at 1185.
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may be one of few possible outs for the ailing debtor." Finally, defenders of
the LBO transaction are eager to point out that for bonds issued after the
Nabisco buyout and the other massive LBOs of the 198os, creditors were on
notice as to the possibility of an LBO; the lack of contractual protections
against an LBO may have been ceded in exchange for a higher interest rate.49 If
this is the case, the creditors have no right to complain when a buyout does
occur: the chance of its happening was priced in.
For these critics, the central problem of the current FTL regime is that it
unduly restricts value-creating transactions. But for others, FTL is a necessary
tool in restricting wealth-transferring buyouts. Recall that failed LBOs harm
existing creditors: they reduce the assets available for distribution to creditors
when the target eventually goes bankrupt. But an LBO can harm existing
creditors before the target enters bankruptcy, or even if it never enters
bankruptcy at all. It can harm them simply because of the increased risk of
bankruptcy. This harm can take a number of forms: First, the highly leveraged
company is less able to endure financial difficulty because of its debt load and is
therefore more likely to fail.so Second, the increased riskiness of the debt can
cause an immediate drop in its market value.s" The 1988 RJR Nabisco buyout
is one prominent example: some bonds plummeted twenty percent in value the
day the buyout was announced.s2 These drops in market value may be
accompanied by bond downgradings. In both the Unocal and Phillips
Petroleum transactions, bond ratings fell drastically from AA to BBB.s" John
Coffee, reviewing an empirical study of changes to bond prices and ratings
following LBOs, concludes that "downgradings by bond rating agencies are in
fact associated with real losses to bondholders, although the loss may typically
precede the downgrading."'
From an equity standpoint, the inherent unfairness in the LBO transaction
lies in part in the subversion of the absolute priority rule: the shareholders get
48. See, e.g., In re Bay Plastics, Inc., 187 B.R- 315, 321 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (confronting a
situation where the existing creditor, enticed by the good credit of the purchaser in contrast
to the poor credit of the target, gave up the security on its debt to facilitate the purchase).
49. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 38, at 835.
So. See Jensen, supra note lo, at 194.
5i. Bratton, supra note 38, at 94.
52. Id.
s3. Id. at 137.
54. John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEo.
L.J. 1495, 1516 (1990).
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paid before the bondholders. Baird and Jackson describe the LBO as the
equivalent of a firm issuing new, senior debt and then disgorging the proceeds
as dividends to existing shareholders.ss Another commentator describes this
scenario in terms of the option theory of the firm, under which shareholders
own the firm along with a put option, written by the bondholders, for the
value of the firm's debt.s6 If the firm goes bankrupt, the shareholders exercise
this put option and the bondholders eat the losses.' LBOs increase the value of
shareholders' put by increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy (and decreasing
the assets available for distribution should bankruptcy occur).ss
In addition to transferring value from creditors to shareholders, LBOs can
also destroy value. As the court noted in Mellon Bank, a leveraged target is "less
able to weather temporary financial storms because debt demands are less
flexible than equity interest[s] ."s The resulting increase in bankruptcies of
otherwise healthy firms destroys wealth. Losses to employees are also a factor;
buyouts often result in downsizing or terminations of pension plans .6 And for
ailing firms for whom a buyout is a gamble at resurrection, an eventual
bankruptcy, because it occurred later rather than sooner, means lower payouts
to creditors after the waste of running at a loss during the gamble.
Any proposed change to the regime of FTL, then, must take both these
points of view into account. FTL should balance promoting value-creating
LBOs against deterring those that are value-destroying.
B. The Problem ofFree Insurance
Recall that from the ex ante position, a successful LBO can be in the
interest of existing unsecured creditors -particularly if the target company
was, as is frequently the case, inefficiently run and financially distressed. If the
LBO is unsuccessful, however, the creditor is likely to receive less on the dollar
for its debts than if the company had skipped the buyout and just entered
bankruptcy sooner rather than later. Whether or not a creditor supports an
LBO ex ante can depend on its view of the LBO's likelihood of success.
5s. Baird & Jackson, supra note 38, at 853.
56. Terence C. Burnham, Is Leverage an Invitation to Bankruptcy? Limits on Liability Actually Are
What Invite the LBOs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1989.
57. Id.
s8. Id.
s9. Mellon Bank, NA. v. Metro Comnic'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 647 (3d Cir. 1991).
6o. See Coffee, supra note 54, at 1521.
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The problem with the existing regime is that it allows a creditor to support
an LBO ex ante, even if the LBO poses significant risk to the company, because
that creditor carries implicit insurance in the form of FTL. If the buyout goes
well, the creditor benefits from the target's increased creditworthiness. If it
goes badly, the creditors can try to partially unwind the transaction through
fraudulent transfer litigation.
In re Bay Plastics provides one example of this.6' Bay Plastics, Inc., the
target company, was in financial distress.2 Milhous Corp. offered to purchase
the ailing company.6 3 One of Bay Plastics's suppliers and creditors, Shintech
Corp., enticed by the good credit of the new purchasers, agreed to give up its
first lien on Bay Plastics's assets so that the purchase could go through,
financed with secured debt.6' Fifteen months after the LBO, when Bay Plastics
entered bankruptcy, Shintech was able to get the lending bank's lien avoided as
a fraudulent transfer.6,
Because of this implicit insurance, creditors are incentivized, in the case of a
distressed debtor, to allow or encourage risky LBOs to go through; they are
rolling the dice with the lending bank's money. Many of the scholars who
argue entirely against the application of FTL to LBOs focus on this concept of
free insurance, worrying that lenders and sellers become the guarantors of the
buyout.6 6 Courts have taken note of this argument, acknowledging the fear
that FTL "gives creditors the ability to 'whipsaw' the debtor, taking advantage
of the successful LBO and suing under fraudulent transfer theories if it is
unsuccessful." 6' The court in Credit Managers similarly worried that
61. 187 B.R. 315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
6a. Id. at 320.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 321.
65. The court did note that Shintech, while in favor of the acquisition, was unaware that
Milhous was not putting up any of its own capital to fund the purchase. Id. at 321. But the
principle here remains the same: a creditor in favor of an LBO, perhaps even facilitating an
LBO, carries implicit insurance against its failure.
66. See generally Baird & Jackson, supra note 38 (arguing that the "inability of parties to opt out"
of fraudulent conveyance law should limit its reach); Anthony Michael Sabino, Applying the
Law of Fraudulent Conveyances to Bankrupt Leveraged Buyouts: The Bankruptcy Code's
Increasing Leverage over Failed LBOs, 69 N.D. L. REv. 15, 41-47 (1993) (discussing the Kaiser
case, where the debtor alleged that payments to its former shareholders in connection with
the LBO constituted a fraudulent conveyance). But see Wahl & Wahl, supra note 38, at 343
(concluding that the "absence of fraudulent conveyance remedies could under deter
unjustified LBOs").
67. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 847 n.io (9 th Cir. 1988).
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[i]f there is no limit on when a creditor can sue to set aside a transfer,
fraudulent conveyance law becomes an insurance policy for creditors of
companies that have gone private. Credit could liberally be extended to
such companies regardless of their assets or cash flow with the
knowledge that the buyout could always be attacked later if the
company folded.6 8
C. Reduced Monitoring Incentives
Critics of applying FTL to LBOs similarly worry that such a guaranty
arrangement reduces monitoring incentives.69 Under the current regime, four
parties are potential monitors to an LBO: the target, the purchaser, the lending
bank, and the pre-existing creditors.
The target's selling shareholders have little incentive to restrain overly-
ambitious LBOs; they simply want to get as much for their shares as possible,
regardless of whether the company they leave behind is insolvent or likely to
default on its debts. They need only discount for the possibility of later,
successful fraudulent transfer litigation that manages to recover some funds
from shareholders.
The purchasers, as we saw in Bay Plastics, rarely invest any significant
amount of their own capital.70 They have much to gain in the case of a
successful LBO and too little to lose in the case of a failed one. They, too, have
little incentive to avoid an overly risky, likely-to-fail LBO.
The lending bank would seem to have the greatest monitoring incentives -
it needs to make sure that the target can pay back the loan from its future cash
flows. The lender is also the cheapest cost avoider given its financial expertise
and essentially unlimited negotiating leverage (that is, if the lender walks away,
the deal falls through). But the bank's interest is limited to ensuring that the
assets securing its loan are sufficient to cover the debts incurred for the buyout.
That is, the bank is less interested in maintaining a proper capital cushion to
cover future involuntary creditors or to pay back existing unsecured creditors
in the case of bankruptcy -again, except insofar as they fear a later, successful
fraudulent transfer action. Further, the lending bank profits from high interest
rates and fees, which in an expected value calculation can offset the slight risk
68. Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Fed. Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 181 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
69. Baird & Jackson, supra note 38, at 840.
7o. Zaretsky, supra note 38, at 1192.
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of their lien being avoided in a successful fraudulent transfer action. Finally,
lenders often sell off LBO debt to third parties, meaning they retain
little interest in the target's long-term success.7' So lenders, too, are
insufficiently motivated to avoid a likely-to-fail LBO, even while that
motivation is bolstered by FTL.
The existing creditors, then, have some interest in monitoring for
themselves, but such an interest is mitigated by the "free insurance" of FTL
discussed above.' As Baird and Jackson put it, creditors "have every incentive
to wait and upset only those transactions that turn out unfavorably from their
perspective."73 Further, even to the extent the creditors do have an interest in
monitoring, they suffer both from a collective action problem and from a poor
monitoring position, since they stand outside of the deal.74 Unlike the three
groups discussed above (the target, the purchaser, and the lender), the pre-
existing creditors are not party to the LBO. They have no good proxy inside the
transaction to represent their interests.
D. Dfficult Post-Hoc Valuations
While the first wave of literature focused on the problems with applying
FTL to LBOs at all, the second wave critiqued the financial standards used to
evaluate LBOs.' Recall that, to satisfy the second prong of a constructively
fraudulent transfer, there is a post-hoc analysis of the company's value back at
the time of the LBO. The creditors must show that the LBO left the target
insolvent, unreasonably undercapitalized, or unlikely to be able to pay its
pi. John H. Ginsberg et al., Befuddlement Betwixt Two Fulcrums: Calibrating the Scales ofJustice
to Ascertain Fraudulent Transfers in Leveraged Buyouts, 19 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 71,
76 (2011).
72. See supra Section II.B.
73. Baird & Jackson, supra note 38, at 840.
74. See Ginsberg et al., supra note 71, at 112 (noting that unsecured creditors have "no good
proxy among the parties to an LBO").
75. See id.; Richard Lieb & Robert J. Feinstein, LBO Litigation, Financial Projections and the
Chapter 11 Plan Process, 21 SETON HAIL L. REV. 598, 606 (1991) (explaining that the past
financial projections by which a failed LBO is evaluated are dependent on highly subjective
assumptions fraught with "inherent difficulty"); Alemante G. Selassie, Valuation Issues in
Applying Fraudulent Transfer Law to Leveraged Buyouts, 32 B.C. L. REV. 377 (1991); Robert J.
Stearn, Jr., Proving Solvency: Defending Preference and Fraudulent Transfer Litigation, 62 Bus.
LAW. 359 (2007).
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debts.7' The fraudulent transfer claim basically alleges that the acquirer paid
too much for the target company, leaving it with debts greater than its value as
a going-concern.? This is because the company goes into debt for the amount
of the purchase price. If the purchase price is above the going-concern value of
the company, then the company is left insolvent after the transaction, one of
the three standards of financial distress necessary to show a fraudulent transfer.
This very claim-that the purchasers paid too much-raises a difficult
threshold objection to the creditor's argument: there are many possible ways to
value a company, but one easy way to do it is to let market forces determine
worth. That is, a company is worth what someone is willing to pay for it. Here,
the creditors allege that the post-hoc, hindsight-biased calculation of their paid
financial expert is more accurate than the price that the market was willing to
pay for the company at the time of the LBO.
It is a difficult objection to overcome, made only more difficult by the
inherent challenges of valuing a company at all on the basis of its balance sheet.
As one bankruptcy court admitted:
Valuation is a malleable concept, tough to measure and tougher to pin
down without a host of explanations, sensitivities and qualifiers.
Because point of view is an important part of the process, outcomes are
also highly dependent upon the perspectives and biases of those doing
the measuring. When it comes to valuation, there is no revealed,
objectively viable truth . . . and consistency among valuation experts
is rare.
In other words, the court ends up refereeing "a battle between ... hired guns
[experts] for each side."'
The literature finds difficulty inherent in these standards of financial
distress. The definition gives a disjunctive list of three standards, but nowhere
specifies which valuation technique should be used in evaluating any of the
three. Alemante Selassie finds that a court's choice of valuation method
depends largely on its view of the underlying transaction and which parties it
thinks should generally bear the risk of an LBO.so In an analysis of solvency,
76. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
77. Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Fed. Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 188 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
78. Id. at 181.
79. In re Charter Commc'ns, 419 B.R. 221, 236 n.n (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
8o. Selassie, supra note 75, at 410.
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for example, the court has discretion to view the target as a going-concern or as
in liquidation.8' Even within those categories, the court makes further
discretionary choices. If the court opts for a liquidation value, there are
questions of timing - "immediate liquidation" or "reasonable time
liquidation.",8' And if a going-concern value basis is chosen, the discount rates
used and the reasonableness of projections made at the time of the LBO must
be evaluated in retrospect.
The "unreasonably small capitalization" standard is even more subjective
than the insolvency standard. The term is not statutorily defined, and courts
have interpreted it differently, either to mean a pledge of all assets (since doing
so leaves the company no easy way to obtain further credit), or to mean a lack
of the working capital needed for the debtor's particular business. John
Ginsberg et al. examine the case law and conclude that courts seem to agree
that an "unreasonably small capital" definition "turns on some probability of
insolvency," but disagree on just what that probability is: in some cases
"likely," and in others, "giving rise to unreasonable risk.",8
A quick example demonstrates the arbitrary nature of post-hoc valuations.
In Bay Plastics, the bankruptcy court, noting that the bankrupt debtor was now
in liquidation as a result of its failed LBO, concluded that "[t]his is a
liquidation case" and removed goodwill from the balance sheet. Without this
going-concern value, the court easily concluded that the debtor was left
insolvent by the leveraged transaction.8 ' But without going-concern value,
most if not all LBOs leave the target insolvent. As one scholar explained,
"because LBOs are premised on the existence of hidden value not recognized in
book values, using book values to measure solvency in LBOs would render
almost every LBO target insolvent, effectively voiding every LBO challenged in
court as a fraudulent conveyance."88 This is also a perfect example of hindsight
bias, which I will discuss next: the judge used the fact that the target was
S. Id. at 395.
82. Id. at 392 (citing United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1304 (3d Cir.
1986)).
83. Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1073 (3d Cir. 1992).
84. Selassie, supra note 75, at 4o6-o8.
85. Ginsberg et al., supra note 71, at 92.
86. In re Bay Plastics, Inc., 187 B.R. 315, 331 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
87. Id.
88. Blackwood, supra note 38, at 369.
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currently in liquidation to impose a liquidation value on the target months
earlier when it underwent the buyout.
E. Hindsight Bias
Recent scholarship in the area of FTL applied to LBOs looks at the problem
of hindsight bias inherent in failed LBO litigation.' One of the reasons
valuation is so difficult is that the adjudication is tainted by hindsight bias.
Creditors allege that the target was left too highly leveraged and too close to
bankruptcy-and their proof is that, well, the target ended up in bankruptcy.
The court is supposed to evaluate the transaction based only on the
circumstances and information at the time of the LBO, but the evidence is
inherently tilted in favor of the plaintiffs. Many scholars have expressed
concern about this sort of "Monday morning quarterbacking."9 After an
extensive review of the empirical evidence of hindsight bias in legal decision-
making, Simkovic and Kaminetzky note that valuation questions may be
particularly prone to hindsight bias, since evidence can be "reconstructed to
reveal arguable deficiencies in audit procedures." 9'
Some courts explicitly resist the bias. The court in Credit Managers Ass'n of
Southern California v. Federal Co. stated that: "With 20-20 hindsight it is clear
that [the target's] cash flows did not work out as projected, [but] the court's
task in determining whether [the target] had sufficient capital . . . is not to
examine what happened to [the target], but whether the projections . . . were
prudent."92 But other courts fall victim to hindsight. Earlier I discussed the bias
in Bay Plastics; United States v. Gleneagles Investment Co. is a second example
of hindsight bias influencing the decision to use a liquidation standard, rather
than the accepted going-concern value standard, in valuing the debtor for the
purposes of the insolvency prong of the fraudulent transfer claim.14 The facts
in this case were particularly egregious - the insider shareholders appeared to
89. See, e.g., Michael Sinkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the
Problem ofHindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 118.
go. Baird & Jackson, supra note 38, at 842.
gi. Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 89, at 155 (quoting Marianne M. Jennings et al.,
Causality as an Influence on Hindsight Bias: An Empirical Examination ofJudges' Evaluation of
Professional Audit Judgment, 21 J. ACT. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 147 (1998)).
92. 629 F. Supp. 175, 186 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
g. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
94 65 F. Supp. 556, 578 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
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have intentionally looted the company at the expense of existing creditors, with
little regard for the target's future. Some have argued that the related,
intentional fraud claim surely spilled over into the constructive fraudulent
transfer claim, coloring the court's valuation. 9s
Hidden hindsight bias is one lurking problem, but even explicit hindsight
bias can be found where FTL is applied to failed LBOs. In Moody v. Security
Pacific Business Credit, the court valued the target's accounts receivable based on
the present fair saleable value after the leveraged transaction, at the time of the
lawsuit, rather than the value set down at the time of the LBO., 6 In the Moody
case, interestingly, the present fair saleable value of the target's accounts
receivable was actually higher at the time of litigation than at the time of the
LBO, which shows that hindsight bias can sometimes advantage the LBO
participants at the expense of creditors." Another example of this "reversed"
hindsight bias is found in In re Ohio Corrugating Co., where the bankruptcy
court concluded that a target was not rendered insolvent by an LBO because of
its demonstrated ability after the buyout to pay off its debts during "normal
operating cycles."98
Whether hindsight bias works in favor of LBO proponents or against it, it
makes for inaccurate analysis of fraudulent transfer claims. If buyouts are being
evaluated by the wrong standards, then parties to an LBO account for that
error ahead of time, and we see the wrong number of LBOs -probably too few,
given that bias usually works against the transaction. This is one major
problem with the current regime of ex post review.
F. Litigation Costs
Other problems with the current FTL regime as applied to LBOs have not
been the focus of academic discussion, but are particularly relevant to my
proposal for ex ante review. Litigation costs are one major disadvantage under
the current regime that would be substantially eliminated by ex ante review.
95. See Selassie, supra note 75, at 411.
g6. Blackwood, supra note 38, at 371 (citing Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1os6,
1o66 (3d Cir. 1992)) ("The target corporation valued its receivables at $7.929 million at the
time of the transaction . . .. Because the company was eventually able to collect $8.3 million
of its accounts outstanding as of the time of the LBO, the court increased the reconstituted
receivables up to $8.3 million - their value as actually collected.").
97. Moody, 971 F.2d at 1066 n.14.
g. 91 B.R. 430, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
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Fraudulent transfer litigation is expensive. The bankruptcy court in In re
Best Products, considering a proposed settlement, suggested that the debtor's
special counsel's prediction of a five million dollar litigation was unrealistically
optimistic." "[T]here can be little doubt that the action would have taken a
period of years to try to its conclusion," the court wrote, imagining "complex,"
"protracted" litigation including "extensive discovery, motion practice, and ...
interlocutory appeals" before trial."oo
Litigating fraudulent transfers is a particularly elaborate matter due to the
number of parties involved, the complexity of financing, and the inexactness of
the standards of financial distress. A typical LBO can include many offerings of
public and private debt, different security interests, and complex corporate
structures.'o' It may also include additional unsecured, subordinated financing,
the lenders of which may be defendants to the suit."02
The matter is further complicated by the fact that fraudulent transfer
claims regarding an LBO will likely be brought during a larger bankruptcy
proceeding. The court in Best Products observed that potential LBO fraudulent
transfer claims were "lurking all the time" as the debtor attempted to organize
a Chapter ii plan of reorganization. 103 In fact, the analysis of the LBO claims
required a stay of the pending plan confirmation process.' 04 Wealth-destroying
bankruptcy costs increase as fraudulent transfer litigation adds to uncertainty
and holds up negotiation.
G. Inadequate Remedy
Inadequate remedy is another problem particularly relevant to a
comparison of ex post versus ex ante review. When an LBO is found to have
been a fraudulent transfer months or years after the transaction, the remedies
available to creditors are often inadequate to restore them to their pre-LBO
positions. One remedy is to avoid the lender's lien on the acquired company's
assets, which leaves the lending bank on equal footing with the other
g. 168 B.R. 35, 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
1o. Id.
1o. Lieb & Feinstein, supra note 75, at 630-31.
ioz. White, supra note 38, at 386.
103. 168 B.R. at 44.
1o4. Id. at 35 ("I must resolve [these] cross-claims in the LBO action before I may consider
confirmation of the plan.").
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unsecured creditors for a share of the estate.o 5 But since the money lent by the
bank went out in large part to the selling shareholders, such a remedy still
leaves unsecured creditors with a smaller piece of the pie than they could have
expected before the LBO. To address this, some courts go further and equitably
subordinate the lending bank's now-unsecured claim to those of pre-existing
creditors."o0
Another option is to use § 550 to try to recover some of the money paid out
to the selling shareholders."o' While recovering money from shareholders
means a greater chance of making creditors whole, courts have largely limited
the remedy to cases where the old shareholders were complicit in a scheme to
loot the target company of value by means of the LBO.os And even when a
court does allow recovery from the selling shareholders, tracking down what
may be a dispersed group of shareholders and recovering that money is hardly
straightforward.
Further complications specific to an LBO make unwinding the transaction
a tricky endeavor. It is common for the target to sell off some assets after the
LBO to reduce its debt load.1o9 The cash proceeds from such a sale go to the
LBO lender in service of the target's new debt, not to the pre-existing creditors.
Additionally, recall that the LBO lenders may sell off some or all of the debt in
the time between the transaction and the fraudulent transfer claim,"0 making
equitable subordination a foggier matter.
In most cases, then, the pre-existing unsecured creditors are likely to
receive less than they would have received absent the LBO. The company
transferred a great deal of value to the selling shareholders -value which is in
most cases unreachable by the time of bankruptcy months or years later.
Further, value presumably has been lost in the interim as the company has
been making interest payments to the lending bank and other expenditures in
an attempt to overhaul what may have been a doomed company even from the
time of the buyout. Because LBOs are examined and remedied so long after the
105. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 13o6-07 (3d Cir. 1986)
(setting aside a lien under state law, rather than federal bankruptcy law); In re Metro
Comnmc'ns, Inc., 135 B.R. 15, 16 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
106. See, e.g., In re O'Day Corp., 126 B.R. 370, 412 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); In re Crowthers
McCall Pattern, Inc., 12o B.R. 279 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
107. See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
ios. See, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 585 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
109. White, supra note 38, at 377.
n1o. Id. at 390.
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transaction, creditors often suffer losses even if successful in their fraudulent
transfer actions.
A full recovery for creditors hurt by truly fraudulent LBOs may be further
precluded by the statute of limitations. Under the federal Bankruptcy Code,
plaintiffs may bring fraudulent transfer actions for transactions that occurred
up to two years before the bankruptcy filing."' The Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act allows for fraudulent transfer claims for up to four years after the
transaction."2 If the highly-leveraged target limps along for several years after
the LBO before filing bankruptcy, FTL is of no help to the creditors.
H. Ex Ante Uncertainty
Finally, the uncertainty created by the specter of future fraudulent transfer
litigation, compounded by the unpredictability of court valuation methods and
the subjectivity of the Bankruptcy Code's standards of financial distress, means
that parties to an LBO must heavily discount the expected profits of the
transaction with the negative expected value of future liability."3 This
complicates not only the decision of whether to go forward with the
transaction in the first place, but also the financing and the structuring of the
deal, as parties try to find ways to shield themselves from eventual litigation."'
Lenders don't know which of the three standards the court will focus on, which
method of valuation it will use, and whether or not the court will collapse the
transaction, consolidate the parties involved, or perform other analytical
acrobatics in the name of equity.
III. PROPOSAL FOR EX ANTE REVIEW
Many of the problems discussed thus far exist because LBOs are reviewed
and potentially avoided only months or years after the transaction in question
has gone through. A process for reviewing LBOs before the transaction is
finalized would minimize many of these difficulties, as well as confer other
advantages. As detailed below, ex ante review would be tied to later
presumptions of constructive fraud, would be performed by an independent
um. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2012).
112. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985).
113. Robert A. Fogelson, Toward a Rational Treatment of Fraudulent Conveyance Cases Involving
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third party, and would provide opportunity for opposition from existing
creditors. Ex ante review would supplant constructive FTL claims; that is,
LBOs greenlit in the review stage could not later be avoided as constructively
fraudulent transfers. However, actual fraudulent transactions would not be
protected by ex ante review, and would still be subject to ex post litigation.
A. Implementation
Under the current FTL regime, the power to avoid fraudulent transfers lies
in §§ 548 and 544 of the Bankruptcy Code. Recall that § 548 defines fraudulent
transfers and gives the court the authority to avoid them; § 544 incorporates
state FTL in addition to federal. Ex ante review could be implemented through
a statutory amendment to both of these two sections. First, the amendment
would carve out a safe harbor for LBOs that have passed ex ante review: these
transactions would not be subject to constructive fraudulent transfer litigation.
To encourage parties to undergo the review, a second provision would provide
that LBOs that did not undergo ex ante review are presumed to be
constructively fraudulent. By building off the existing framework of 55 548 and
544, ex ante review thus implemented requires no additional statutory
authority. It becomes functionally necessary (because of the consequence of a
presumptively fraudulent transaction) without the additional authority
required to make it actually mandatory. This sort of "double-edged" safe
harbor is functionally equivalent to both requiring ex ante review and
supplanting FTL.
If an LBO does not undergo review and later enters bankruptcy, creditors
will enjoy the presumption of constructive fraud. That is, the transaction is
presumed to have failed one or more of the standards of financial distress.
Parties to the LBO will have a chance to rebut this presumption with financial
data, but will have hindsight bias and the presumption working against them.
Given this rebuttable presumption of constructive fraud, the burden of
proof would be on the debtor to show that the LBO did not leave the firm
failing one of the three prongs of financial distress. This shifts the burden of
proof from the current system of ex post review, where the creditors must
show one of the three prongs. The debtor would meet its burden by presenting
the financial models used to project the LBO's success at the time of the
transaction. Of course, the debtor faces a difficult inquiry here: if the
transaction was sound, why did you fail to submit it for ex ante review?
Debtors could further bolster their case by showing that unexpected,
intervening causes, rather than inherent financial instability, led to the
bankruptcy.
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The presumption should be sufficiently difficult to rebut to prevent repeat
players from strategically bypassing ex ante review, preferring to roll the dice
than to risk having the transaction stopped ahead of time. But while selling
shareholders or managers may be incented to take the risk, the lending bank
certainly is not -it has the most to lose if the LBO later fails and the parties face
a rebuttable presumption of constructive fraud. From the lender's perspective,
ex ante review is just one more step in the diligence process; it ensures, with an
objective, third-party stamp of approval, that they're lending into a financially
stable deal. Selling shareholders would be hard-pressed to convince a lending
bank to conspire with them to strategically bypass review; there is simply not
enough in it for the banks.
The amendment to the Bankruptcy Code would further need to define
"LBO" to specify which transactions can reach the safe harbor through ex ante
review (and, correspondingly, which must undergo review to avoid the
presumption of constructive fraud). The definition should be expansive but
also flexible, capturing the type of creditor-harming transactions that this Note
has already explored. A flexible definition gives judges some latitude as to
when to apply the double-edged safe harbor should the question arise ex post
in a bankruptcy proceeding following a failed LBO. Judges would be looking
for substance -is this the kind of LBO that shifted wealth from creditors to
shareholders? -over the form that a technical and rigid definition would
require. With little to lose and much to gain, if ex ante there were any doubt as
to whether an LBO fit the flexible definition, parties to an LBO would be
inclined to err on the side of caution and undergo review. After all, one of the
advantages of ex ante review is that it confers a stamp of confidence on the
transaction. Refusal to submit to ex ante review -even on the grounds that the
transaction might squeak by outside the technical definition of LBOs-may
weaken the confidence of the lending bank. If the transaction is sound, the
parties have no reason to try to escape review.
A flexible, working definition of an LBO should involve a conjunctive list of
requirements that captures all the features of the potentially creditor-harming
transactions discussed thus far. First, the buyout substantially increases the
debt-to-equity ratio of the target. This eliminates buyout transactions in which
the company is already highly leveraged, as well as acquisitions financed with
equity and not debt (that is, when the acquiring company uses its own cash to
buy the target). In neither of these cases does the risk of existing debt increase
significantly as a result of the transaction. Second, the transaction involves the
creation or transfer of a control block of shares, as is the case in the going-
private LBOs. This eliminates non-buyout transactions in which a company
issues additional debt to raise capital (and therefore increases its debt-to-equity
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ratio, perhaps substantially, but without a change in control). Since the
double-edged safe harbor is meant to apply to buyout transactions, it should
not overreach to interfere with standard debt issuances. After all, one of the
main justifications for protecting LBOs from ex post fraudulent transfer attack
is that they facilitate the market for corporate control; such a justification does
not extend to debt issuances. Third, the transaction does not offer to redeem all
pre-existing debt. This eliminates buyout transactions that protect creditors by
giving them a chance to cash out their debt (or renegotiate for new interest
rates commensurate with the additional risks of leverage) before it increases in
risk and drops in value. These creditors do not need the protection of ex ante
review to ensure that the buyout is sound.
B. Procedural Details
Parties to an LBO - that is, the selling shareholders, the acquirer, and the
lending bank-would file for review with an independent third party which
could take the form of a court-appointed examiner, auditor, or valuation
expert. The most natural choice for a reviewer seems to be an accountant, since
the standards that an LBO must pass in ex ante review all relate directly to the
financials of the target company. Because those parties are properly
incentivized to have the transaction reviewed, existing creditors need not take
action to initiate review. Parties to the LBO would file for review of their own
accord knowing that, if they do not, the double-edged safe harbor will render
their transaction presumptively constructively fraudulent should the target
enter bankruptcy at a later date.
The acquirer and lending bank need only to turn over to the reviewer the
extensive due diligence they have already performed regarding the firm's
assets, liabilities, and projections of future cash flows. Before lending into a
buyout, a bank examines the target's financials, creating pro forma schedules of
assets and liabilities, obtaining statements of assurance from the target's CFO,
and using discounted cash flow projections to estimate the target's debt-
earnings ratio post-buyout.' A number of consultants take part in the process,
including accounting firms, investment banks, valuation experts, and
lawyers." Under the current regime, investment bankers and valuation
experts sometimes hesitate to issue strong solvency opinions, in large part
115. Christian C. Day et al., Riding the Rapids: Financing the Leveraged Transaction Without Getting
Wet, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 661, 736-38 (1990).
ii. Matthew T. Kirby et al., Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged Buyout Lending, 43 Bus.
LAW. 27, 40 (1987).
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because of the potential liability associated with a future fraudulent transfer
claim." 7 With the specter of such litigation eliminated, experts can more fairly
evaluate the prospects of the target company. Any solvency opinions still have
to pass muster under the eye of the reviewer, but valuators need not discount
for the possibility of hindsight bias or other complications in a future
bankruptcy litigation. Rating agencies sometimes participate in the review
process, too, as parties to an LBO often structure the transaction with the
intention of achieving a certain debt rating in the target's post-LBO debt."8
Since the acquirer and the lending bank already complete all this due diligence
for their own purposes, submitting to ex ante review by turning over that
material does not impose large additional information-gathering costs on the
transaction.
If the target wants the LBO approved, it is incentivized to cooperate in
turning over its financial information to the reviewer. In the case of a hostile
takeover, management of the target may resist turning over information to the
reviewer if they are certain the information would help the LBO pass ex ante
review; this would indeed be another weapon in management's arsenal against
the desires of its shareholders to sell. The public security filings of publicly
traded companies, however, may be sufficient, particularly when supplemented
by the diligence work of the lending bank.
The reviewer would then use all of the submitted information to analyze
the proposed LBO under the same three standards of financial distress used to
evaluate transactions under current FTL. That is, the reviewer would ask
whether the transaction would leave the target insolvent, inadequately
capitalized, or unlikely to be able to pay its debts as they came due. Under a
regime of ex ante review, there is no change to the standards of evaluation-
only to the timing. While the three standards of financial distress would still
suffer from the subjectivity and indeterminacy already discussed,"' the analysis
is relieved of the burden of hindsight and the other difficulties of ex post
review. Valuation difficulties aside, an analysis of the transaction's feasibility at
the time of the LBO is best completed at the time of the LBO.
One modification for ex ante review, however, would be to drop the third
standard of financial distress. As discussed earlier, "unreasonable
capitalization" is arguably the most subjective standard,"o one with no
11. Blackwood, supra note 38, at 374.
118. Ginsberg et al., supra note 71, at 94.
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statutory definition and a history of inconsistent interpretation in the courts."2
While Congress found the standard sufficiently firm to impose on failed LBOs,
imposing it on proposed LBOs is admittedly a different matter. Since the very
nature of an LBO is to leave a firm highly leveraged- that is, with a small
capital cushion-we might see too many of what belowm are labeled Type I
(false negative) errors if we impose this standard ex ante. We could reduce
these Type I errors by implementing ex ante review with a modified scheme of
only the first two standards -insolvency and inability to pay debts as they
come due.'
While creditor action is not required to initiate ex ante review, creditors
would have the opportunity to oppose the buyout by submitting their own
materials to the reviewer -for example, valuations from their own hired expert
that contradict the valuations submitted by the acquirer and lender. The
reviewer would then consider the data and arguments of both sides in his
evaluation of the transaction. Indeed, even under the current regime, there
seems to be nothing stopping creditors from suing to enjoin a pending LBO
before it is finalized.'" Such intervention would likely play out in the same
kind of dueling-experts valuation battle that we currently see under fraudulent
transfer litigation, only with the advantage of settling the valuation question
before and not after it's too late. In order to give full opportunity to creditors to
participate in the process, an additional requirement of submitting for ex ante
review would be to notify all creditors of such submission.
The review process could be iterative; that is, if the reviewer rejects the
proposed transaction, the interested parties could re-work the transaction and
submit again for another review. For example, if the reviewer finds that the sale
leaves the company too highly leveraged, parties could reduce the purchase
price, or the purchasing group could contribute equity alongside the lender's
loan. These two possible features of the review process - the opportunity for
creditors to litigate ex ante and the opportunity for parties to the transaction to
resubmit for subsequent review -might functionally turn the process into a
negotiation between the creditors and the LBO proponents, with the reviewer
121. Selassie, supra note 75, at 4o6-o8.
122. See infra Section IV.C.
123. What this conversation really requires is a proper review of all three standards of financial
distress, and an exploration of whether better alternatives exist. This would require an
empirical study of the financials of failed LBOs at the time of the transaction, alongside
parallel data from successful LBOs, to see which standards best predict bankruptcy, and
thus would best distinguish ex ante between likely-to-succeed and likely-to-fail transactions.
124. Ginsberg et al., supra note 71, at lo6.
1857
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
acting on behalf of the creditors to ensure that the transaction does not leave
the target in financial distress. This addresses both the collective action and
sophistication concerns that normally arise where the interests of a group of
unsecured creditors are involved.
Under the proposed regime, the acquiring company would be responsible
for paying the costs associated with third party review. In practice, these costs
might very well be passed on to-or at least shared by-the selling
shareholders, in the form of a lower purchase price paid. Recall, however, that
the shareholders are often paid a premium for their shares in a leveraged
buyout. Part of the criticism of LBOs is that they involve a wealth transfer from
debt holders to shareholders. Since ex ante review protects debt holders, but is
paid for by shareholders, it works in the opposite direction as that wealth
transfer. Shareholders might walk away with a lower premium, but creditors
are protected against unsound transactions that greatly reduce the value of
their debt.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF EX ANTE REVIEW
A. Hindsight Bias
Since review is performed before the LBO instead of after, it isn't tainted by
the same kind of hindsight bias we see under the current regime. The
reviewing party need not pretend it doesn't know the LBO eventually failed in
order to determine if it was likely to fail months earlier. The questions
presented for valuation are best answered with contemporaneous data- the
target's present financial information -rather than old figures that are subject
to manipulation based on eventual outcomes. The question of whether an LBO
was a good idea at the time is best decided, well, at the time.
It is illuminating to compare the benefits of ex ante review to another
proposal addressing the hindsight problem. Michael Simkovic and Benjamin S.
Kaminetzky propose that, to escape hindsight bias, bankruptcy courts look at
the spreads of the target's credit default swaps in the time leading up to the
LBO to determine whether, according to the market, the target was already
headed for bankruptcy before the buyout took place.us This way, they argue,
courts can sidestep some of the hindsight bias inherent in ex post analysis.
Ex ante review, like Simkovic and Kaminetzky's proposal, seeks to remedy
hindsight bias, but with a different solution. It departs from existing
125. Simkovic & Kaninetzky, supra note 89.
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scholarship in this area by proposing that LBOs be evaluated for financial
distress before they ever take place. Ex ante review would generate enormous cost
savings: wealth-destroying transactions would be precluded, rather than
remedied; litigation costs would be minimized if not entirely removed. Unlike
Simkovic and Kaminetzky's proposal, it would work for all target companies,
not only those with widely traded credit default swaps. Also, unlike the credit
default swap solution, it would entirely remove hindsight bias, rather than
adding a piece of unbiased data to the mountain of biased evidence before the
court. Ex ante review would even make it easier for parties to engage in wealth-
creating LBOs, since they would no longer need to discount for the probability
of fraudulent transfer litigation in the wake of an unexpected downturn.
B. Improved Valuation
Absent ex ante opposition by creditors, a neutral, third-party appraisal
takes the "dueling hired guns" problem out of LBO analysis. It gives the final
say on valuation to one financial expert, rather than to a court faced with
conflicting testimony from two biased and conflicting hired experts. Of course,
if creditors do choose to oppose the LBO with valuation data of their own, the
dueling guns problem returns. However, such ex ante opposition is not
required under the proposed regime, and, unlike ex post litigation, review can
take place without it.
One problem with having one expert instead of two is that it might reduce
the accuracy of the valuation. Importantly, opponents to ex ante review might
suggest that the accounting firm or other reviewer appointed to review is
incentivized to approve the LBO so that it gets more work in the future. But
accounting firms, investment banks, and other firms already face these
conflicts in all areas involving valuation; we simply rely on these firms to
protect their long-term reputations at the expense of increased short-
term business.
C. Discrimination Between LBOs that Will Fail the Standards ofFinancial
Distress and LBOs that Will Pass Them
When lenders and purchasers discount for all of this uncertainty, they
decline to undertake some LBO opportunities that, but for the risks presented
by fraudulent transfer litigation, have a positive expected value. The parties to
the transaction have to discount both in the case of likely-to-pass LBOs and
likely-to-fail LBOs, for a number of reasons: a hindsight-biased court might
impose liability for a once-likely-to-pass buyout that, for unforeseeable
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reasons, went badly; creditors may later be able to extract settlement value even
if the fraudulent transfer claims are weak; and courts may interpret the
Bankruptcy Code's unpredictable standards of financial distress in some
unanticipated way. The discounting imposed by the current regime falls on
good and bad transactions alike.
An ex ante review, by contrast, distinguishes between likely-to-pass LBOs
and likely-to-fail LBOs, encouraging the former and chilling the latter. Review
encourages the former because parties to the transaction rest safe in the
knowledge that the buyout, if deemed now to pass the standards of financial
distress, cannot later be unwound after some series of unforeseen events. It
chills the latter because it sets out an extra procedural hurdle for the transaction
to clear before going forward. It puts more scrutiny-and more importantly,
disinterested scrutiny-on the deal. Negotiating parties, knowing this ahead of
time, may even be less likely to put such likely-to-fail LBOs up for review in
the first place, further reducing wasteful transaction and review costs.
Jenny and Edward Wahl consider a similar view of LBOs in the context of
Type I and Type II errors.6 A Type I error occurs when a likely-to-pass LBO
is barred, while a Type II error occurs when a likely-to-fail LBO is allowed to
go through to completion." This is a useful framework for analyzing the issue.
While removing LBOs from the arena of FTL would eliminate Type I errors, it
would do so only by increasing the number of Type II errors. Ex ante review,
on the other hand, works by decreasing both Type I and Type II errors, for
precisely the reasons discussed above: fewer likely-to-fail LBOs are put up for
review in the first place, and more scrutiny is attached to them, reducing Type
II errors; LBO proponents no longer need to discount likely-to-pass LBOs for
fraudulent transfer avoidance, reducing Type I errors.
Further, scholars worry that the cost of capital for an LBO is made
unnecessarily high by the risk of fraudulent transfer litigation, as the lender
increases interest rates to compensate for the negative expected value of having
its lien on the target's assets avoided. ,8 Since ex ante review eliminates this
future risk to the lender, we might expect the lender to pass on those savings to
the purchaser and the target company. This makes an LBO more affordable,
from the perspective of the post-LBO company, increasing the number of
potential purchasers and resulting in a general boost to the market for
corporate control.
126. Wahl &Wahl, supra note 38, at 364-66.
127. Id.
128. Zaretsky, supra note 38, at 1200.
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D. Sharing the Benefits ofan LBO: Turning Kaldor-Hicks-Optimal Buyouts
into Pareto-Optimal Buyouts
The distinction between likely-to-pass and likely-to-fail buyouts raises a
question: what exactly constitutes a successful LBO? The question is not only
whether the transaction constitutes a wealth transfer from bondholders to
shareholders, but also whether the transaction is wealth-creating in sum.
Empirical studies have examined the losses to bondholders and the gains to
shareholders in LBOs and concluded that stockholder gains tend to far exceed
bondholder losses.' 29 The Nabisco buyout provides one example.' The
purchaser paid stockholders $1o9 for shares that, before announcement of the
buyout, were trading at $55."' Met Life estimated after the deal that it would
have cost the purchasers an average of $4 per share to make bondholders whole
again for losses in the bond trading values after announcement of the
buyout.3 1 Coffee argues that it is equitable to demand such compensation.3 3
First, investors are not all evenly invested in equity and debt, which means
some investors consistently lose while others consistently win in a wealth
transfer from bondholders to shareholders.3 4 Second, insofar as some of the
losers in the transaction, like employees, are geographically concentrated, "a
regulatory mismatch is created," with small, local parties unable to fight the
interests of the parties on the other side (e.g., lending banks).'
We can analyze the distinction between wealth-transferring and wealth-
creating transactions from the standpoint of Pareto efficiency versus Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency.16 A transaction is Pareto efficient if it makes some parties
better off while making no party worse off.3' An LBO that yielded gains to
shareholders and no losses to bondholders, employees, or involuntary creditors
129. Bratton, supra note 38, at 123 (citing Robert A. Taggart, The Growth of the "Junk" Bond
Market and Its Role in Financing Takeovers, in MERGERS AND AcoulstrioNs 5, 6-1i (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 4th ed. 1988)).
130. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
131. Coffee, supra note 54, at 1544 (citing Barbara Franklin, Met Life Looks for Help, N.Y. L.J.,
May 11, 1989, at 5, col. 5).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1544 n.176.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1548.
136. See Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard
Posner's The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1105, io6 (1982).
137. Id. at 1107.
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would be Pareto efficient. A transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it results in
net gains to the parties involved. ,8 An LBO that earned shareholders a $20
million premium on their shares and cost bondholders $15 million in losses
would be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. One way of looking at a Kaldor-Hicks
efficient transaction is to say that, by rearranging the gains among the different
parties, Pareto optimality could be attained.
Contractual solutions like poison puts, discussed in the next Section,'
under which the acquirer in an LBO must buy out all existing debt at face
value, ensures that a proposed LBO is at least Kaldor-Hicks efficient. The
acquirer will not attempt to make the bondholders whole if, after doing so,
there is not also enough profit leftover for the acquirer to keep for itself. In
other words, by buying out existing debt, acquirers turn a Kaldor-Hicks
efficient transaction into a Pareto efficient transaction. At least, they do so as
far as the parties of bondholders and equity holders are concerned; whether
employees, future creditors, or involuntary creditors should also be
compensated is another question. Indeed, others have proposed, in the context
of an LBO, similar compensatory wealth transfers: pre-funding certain
obligations of the target,"o compensating employees terminated as a result of
the buyout,"' or increasing the interest rates of existing creditors.14
In the negotiation induced by ex ante review, existing creditors, purchasers,
and selling shareholders can analyze the proposed LBO through the lenses of
Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.' Through changes in the purchase price,
or through offers to redeem debt, wealth created by the buyout may be
allocated to one party or another to turn Kaldor-Hicks LBOs into Pareto LBOs.
This ensures that all parties are made better off-or at least no worse off-by
the transaction. It also puts additional roadblocks - third party review, creditor
opposition-in the way of wealth-destroying LBOs that benefit selling
shareholders at the expense of creditors.
138. Id.
139. See infra notes 1is-160 and accompanying text.
140. See Burnham, supra note 56.
141. Coffee, supra note S4, at 1548 (explaining that "losers" in a takeover include employees while
"winners" include shareholders, and suggesting that future policy consider forcing
"winners" to compensate "losers").
142. Graml, supra note 6, at 37.
143. Coffee, supra note 54, at 1548 (suggesting that social policy should consider moving us from
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E. Risk Sharing and Monitoring Incentives
A regime of ex ante review puts more eyes on the buyout, including those
of a neutral third party. Giving the creditors the opportunity to object to the
transaction before it takes place means that those creditors no longer get free
insurance at the expense of lending banks; it shifts the monitoring
responsibility to the party whose interests are served by monitoring, and whose
monitoring efforts generate the fewest externalities. Given that unsecured
creditors face a collective action problem outside of bankruptcy, it is central to
the proposed regime that skipping review carries the penalty of the
presumption of constructive fraud; in this way, review is not contingent on
opposition from the unsecured creditors (even though they are still afforded
the opportunity to object and to participate in the review process).
Some may object that the bank is still in the best position to monitor the
deal-it is the cheapest cost avoider'-and thus the bank, not the creditors,
should be responsible for monitoring. A third-party financial expert, though,
provided with all the information available to the bank, is just as capable a
monitor as the lending bank, but without the bank's self-interest. The creditors
may not be in the best monitoring position, yes -but the regime provides them
with a champion to monitor on their behalf.
F. Remedy and Costs
As discussed above, 4 s the current regime of ex post review leaves
inadequate remedies for the parties damaged by a constructively fraudulent
transaction. Under ex ante review, by contrast, likely-to-fail LBOs are enjoined
beforehand, preventing the damage rather than trying to undo it after the fact.
For ailing companies for which an LBO was tantamount to a rescue, that might
mean a bankruptcy now instead of later-but before time and money are
expended in the rescue. Ex ante prevention, rather than ex post avoidance, also
saves the creditors the high costs of fraudulent transfer litigation.
G. Assimilation ofFraudulent Transfer Law into Fraud Tort Law
By taking constructive fraudulent transfer claims out of the creditor
arsenal, the proposed regime would filter many more LBO challenges into the
144. Selassie, supra note 75, at 429.
145. See supra Section II.G.
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arena of actual fraud. The issue at litigation becomes not whether the target
company was left undercapitalized or insolvent or unable to pay its debts, but
rather whether the target company fully and accurately disclosed all of its
financial information to the purchasers, lending bank, creditors, and third-
party appraiser. In other words, creditors are not left without ex post recourse
for LBOs later revealed to be manipulative. Questions of fraud and full
disclosure are much better suited to ex post litigation than is the issue of
valuation; that more information has come to light helps the court determine
the question before it, rather than obscuring that question with hindsight bias.
Essentially, as far as LBOs are concerned, the proposed regime assimilates the
controversial and, as many have argued, outdated 6 FTL into the better-suited
law of fraud.
V. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF EX ANTE REVIEW
A. Why Don't Creditors Just Protect Themselves?
One obvious criticism of any regime that protects creditors against overly
risky LBOs is this: Why don't the creditors protect themselves contractually?
Bond covenants could impose a ceiling on the debtor debt-to-equity ratio that
effectively precludes an LBO; contingent rate-shifting bonds could compensate
creditors if a debtor takes action to increase bond risk.
Scholars have posed a number of possible answers to this question.'4 ' In
the case of the massive LBOs of the mid-198os like the RJR Nabisco buyout,
146. Commentators object that fraudulent conveyance law, deriving from English law that
stopped consumer creditors from nominally transferring assets before bankruptcy with the
intent of taking them back after, has no place in the arena of corporate buyouts. Baird and
Jackson, in their seminal argument against fraudulent transfer law as applied to LBOs,
referring to the original English case from which the law derived, noted succinctly that a
"firm that incurs obligations in the course of a buyout does not seem at all like the
Elizabethan deadbeat who sells his sheep to his brother for a pittance." Baird & Jackson,
supra note 38, at 852.
147. See generally Coffee, supra note 54, at 1502-03 (exploring the possibility that bondholders
earn higher interest in return for the lack of covenants; that risk was so low it was not worth
protecting against; that bondholders believed the law already protected them; and that
bondholders relied on an implicit agreement with managers); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 45 (1986)
(suggesting that perhaps proper protective mechanisms had not yet developed); Graml,
supra note 6, at 13-14 (noting that bondholders believed that management was constrained
from opportunistic behavior by the knowledge that such behavior would prompt the
imposition of restrictive covenants on future bond issuances).
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an easy answer is that creditors never anticipated such a transaction, or thought
the law would protect against this type of wealth transfer."' To this point,
creditors in Nabisco argued (unsuccessfully) that the debtor's management
violated the implied standard of good faith and fair dealing by cashing out
equity at the expense of pre-existing debt. 49
But this explanation is less satisfying for bonds issued afier the 198os, when
creditors were aware of the danger of over-leveraging subsequent to a bond
issuance. Still, even in the 199os, scholars posited that the probability of an
LBO was too low to warrant bondholder concern."so
Another possibility is that creditors give up contractual protections against
levering up in exchange for a higher interest rate. In this way, the risk of an
LBO is already priced in. Coffee explores the possibility that negative
covenants are not reliable protections against all levering transactions; when
investors cannot distinguish between strong indentures and weak ones, a
market for lemons develops in which debtors cannot expect lower interest rates
by credibly committing to covenants precluding risky leveraged transactions.'
Further, given the tax advantages to the corporation of higher debt levels, it
may be difficult to distinguish between "opportunistic" leveraging and
leveraging done for good "business purposes.""s2
Additionally, Coffee suggests that creditors may be free-riding on the
known risk aversion of managers, who have too much undiversifiable human
capital invested in the firm to take such large risks.'s If managers are risk-
averse, however, it seems they wouldn't object to covenants limiting the
leverage of the company. Coffee also argues that there may just be too many
ways for managers to increase firm-specific risk for creditors to attempt to
circumscribe all such behavior via contractual covenants. 54 In the case of LBOs,
however, a leverage-limit covenant seems to cover all bases.
One contractual provision does attempt to protect bondholders against
losses associated with an LBO: the "poison put," which is triggered at the
occurrence of both a designated event, such as a change in control or an all-
148. Coffee, supra note 54, at 1503.
149. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
1so. Fogelson, supra note 113, at 594 ("An LBO is not a typical occurrence and cannot be
compared to . . . typical risks. . . . It is doubtful that creditors contemplate the complete
replacement of equity with huge amounts of senior debt.").
151. Coffee, supra note 54, at 1511.
152. Id. at i5o8.
153. Coffee, supra note 147, at 8 n.16.
154. Id.
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asset sale, and a downgrade in bond rating."ss If both these conditions are met,
a poison put allows the bondholder to redeem his bond early and at full
face value."56
For a number of reasons, however, poison puts are inadequate to address
the problem of wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders in an LBO.
First, redemption at face value could still amount to a loss to bondholders,
relative to their position before the triggering event, if interest rates have risen
since the debt was issued. Second, the condition of a downgrade by Moody's or
Standard & Poor's will not necessarily be met immediately upon
announcement by the firm of an LBO, even if that announcement resulted in a
decline in the market value of the bonds.' 7 Bond ratings are retrospective, and
often the change in a targeted company's rating does not occur until four or
five months after the announcement of the buyout.s8 Third, poison puts
generally only last for ten years, even for bonds of longer duration, because the
market is not willing to pay for protection further out in time."5
Graml further offers procedural reasons that contractual provisions like
poison puts have not supplanted FTL. Bond contracting is not typical arms-
length bargaining taking place between individual creditors and debtors.16o
Instead, underwriters negotiate the contract with the debtor on behalf of the
eventual creditors. To the extent that the underwriter is not able to
exhaustively communicate to the future creditors the value of each covenant
negotiated- perhaps because of a lack of sophistication on the part of bond
buyers -such covenants in turn hold less value for the underwriter. This may
be the reason that restrictive covenants in indenture contracts are "boilerplate
provisions" that are never negotiated.16' By nature, the contract is an adhesive
one for the eventual creditor. Other scholars agree that creditors "do not have
the bargaining power to protect their claims from . . . subordination [to
creditor claims in an LBO] in advance." "
155. Graml, supra note 6, at 34.
156. Id.
157. Coffee, supra note 54, at 15io n.51.
158. Id.
159. Graml, supra note 6, at 37 (citing Peter Heberling, Event Risk Provisions Protect Bondholders
A.Zainst Takeovers, NAT'L LAw. J., June 5, 1989, at 22).
16o. Id. at 16.
161. Id. at 16-17.
162. Fogelson, supra note 113, at 594.
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For all these reasons, creditors do not protect themselves contractually
under the current FTL regime. This would likely remain the status quo
under the proposed regime, as well, for all the reasons discussed above:
creditors give up covenants for higher interest rates; they rely on manager's
implicit risk-aversion; they cannot distinguish between opportunistic and
efficient leveraging; and bondholders do not negotiate for themselves for bond
provisions.
Further, ex ante review is superior to a contractual solution in a number of
ways. First, ex ante review would be a single, centralized process. The debtor
would not individually negotiate with each creditor, nor would the creditors be
required to overcome any kind of collective action problem or holdout
incentive, as they would in a bond redemption negotiation.
Imagine a distressed debtor whose bonds are trading below par due to the
market's assessment of its default risk. If the creditors were protected by bond
covenants, rather than by a regime of ex ante review, the debtor could negotiate
with individual bondholders for a redemption price at which the bondholder
and the target share the potential benefits of the LBO (e.g., increased access to
capital from the new lenders, synergistic gains with the new owner, etc.) while
sharing the risk of increased leverage. Multiple negotiations with dispersed
creditors impose costs in time and money, compared to the centralized process
of ex ante review.
Similarly, a requirement of bond redemption at face value, or a poison put,
is both overprotective and underprotective of the creditors. It may be
underprotective if interest rates have fallen since the bonds were issued. It may
be overprotective and confer a windfall to bondholders if the bonds were
trading below par before the announcement of an LBO, either because of firm-
specific default risk or because interest rates had risen since the bonds were
issued. Such overcompensation of the bondholders means that some likely-to-
pass LBOs will be precluded by artificially high costs of the transaction. Finally,
even if a poison put neither under- nor over-compensated bondholders, it still
substantially increases the capital required to complete the leveraged
transaction.
B. Type I Errors in Ex Ante Review
As discussed above,' Type I errors are false negatives. In the context of ex
ante review, that means LBOs that would have been successful but were barred
163. See supra Section W.C.
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by ex ante review. One strong criticism of an ex ante regime is that ex post
litigation applies only to bankrupt firms; ex ante review, however, applies to all
LBOs, and thus might result in a significant number of these Type I errors.
Consider the LBO, however, that fails ex ante review: to do so, it must
meet one of the three standards of financial distress. Congress decided that
these standards marked the point at which the wealth transfer through risk-
shifting from shareholders to bondholders becomes unacceptable. An LBO that
meets one of the standards of financial distress is not a sound transaction. It
represents the shareholders and the lending bank gambling with the creditors'
money. In an equitable analysis, such a gamble should be stopped - even if that
gamble later turns out to be successful. It is no defense for the shareholders to
argue that their gambling with the creditors' money is acceptable just because
that gamble happened to pay off.
Putting equity aside and considering only efficiency, transactions that meet
one of the standards of financial distress are likely to be wealth-destroying in
net. Consider the three standards: the target is left with unreasonably small
capitalization; the target is unlikely to be able to pay its debts as they come
due; or the target is left insolvent. All three of these standards mean
a likelihood of eventual bankruptcy, which entails enormous costs to all parties
involved.
For this reason, we need not worry about the LBOs that would have
succeeded but for being barred by ex ante review. Those LBOs are, by the very
definition of the standards of financial distress, the great minority.
One way, however, to mitigate this concern would be to alter the standards
of financial distress to a more lenient form. This proposal suggests importing
the same standards from ex post review; but perhaps ex ante review calls for
lesser standards. After all, one might object, the nature of an LBO is to place a
firm in a near-bankrupt state. The nature of the LBO is a gamble. While this
Note takes the position that the current standards would be as apt for review ex
ante as they are ex post, a softer form of this proposal may better allay concerns
that too many transactions will be barred. The standards could be changed in
degree without being changed in substance; for example, a modified
insolvency standard might require that the debtor be left insolvent with no
reasonable chance of achieving solvency in the foreseeable future.
Several issues are at stake in the question of how best to discipline
constructively fraudulent LBOs. Excessively rigid standards unduly restrict the
market for corporate control, weakening an important tool for keeping
corporations efficient. Excessively loose standards, on the other hand, allow
shareholders to extract wealth from creditors too easily, which in turn could
drive up interest rates to compensate for additional risk. The current standards
imposed by the Bankruptcy Code reflect Congress's line-drawing, and
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that line may need to be re-drawn if all LBOs, not just those that fail, are
disciplined by it.
C. Information and Transaction Costs
The proposed regime involves some additional ex ante costs for finalizing
an LBO. The target must provide extensive information to the third-party
reviewer, as well as putting on notice all of its current creditors, who, under the
proposed regime, are given the opportunity to participate in the review process
by actively opposing the LBO. As discussed, 4 however, the target, purchaser,
and lending bank already engage in extensive due diligence during the
negotiation and preparation of a buyout."'s Under the notification portion of
this proposed regime, this work is simply made public and subject to
additional monitoring by the other parties with a stake in the transaction.
While turning over information to the reviewer requires little additional
work, the process of review itself will impose a more substantial cost on the
transaction. The acquirers are paying for the reviewer's time and expertise. If
creditors fight the buyout by submitting their own valuations and projections,
then the acquirers also pay bankers or valuation experts to analyze this data
and oppose it. That imposes additional costs on the creditors, who pay to hire
their own expert to challenge the financial picture painted by the acquirers.
Given the collective action problem that creditors face, it seems unlikely that
any small stakeholders would be willing to foot such an expense. If this is the
case, the ability to litigate ex ante could be criticized as fair in theory while
unrealistic in practice. Still, creditors with large stakes in the company, or
sophisticated investors who are able to collaborate, may find opposing the
buyout to be in their interests.
For any single buyout, the procedural costs of ex ante review are likely still
dwarfed by the enormous magnitude of full-blown fraudulent transfer
litigation in the midst of a bankruptcy proceeding. The criticism of ex ante
review, however, is that these costs are imposed on every LBO, while ex post
litigation occurs only in a handful of cases. Reviewing every proposed LBO
sounds wasteful. If a transaction passes review, in some sense that review
represents the wasted cost of a double-check on a sound transaction. From this
perspective, Simkovic and Kaminetzky's approach of using credit default swap
prices leading up to the buyout in order to evaluate a failed LBO is superior to
164. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
165. Day, supra note 115, at 736-37.
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ex ante review: it beats hindsight bias, but still limits review to those
transactions that have actually failed. Comparing the two regimes, the
question, then, is whether the procedural costs of ex ante review are less than
the expected value of the costs of ex post litigation, when such litigation is
discounted by the probability of bankruptcy.
But in fact we can go further in this cost comparison. It is inequitable to
allow shareholders to gamble unreasonably with bondholder money even if
that gamble ultimately pays off. It is no equitable defense of a prohibited
wealth-transfer for the shareholders to argue that it all worked out in the end.
Likely-to-fail buyouts are not only wealth-transferring, but wealth-destroying.
The goal should be to stop all likely-to-fail buyouts -that is, all the buyouts
that fail the standards of financial distress - not just the ones that ultimately do
fail. When we add this consideration to the cost equation, we reduce the net
costs of the proposed regime.
D. Restricting Market Forces
Imposing external review on the market for corporate control also feels like
an undue restriction of market forces. Mergers and acquisitions are private,
contractually-governed transactions; it is generally left up to the parties
involved to protect themselves through negotiation, and up to market forces to
determine proper pricing. Further, without extensive regulatory reach, there
seems to be little authority to place such an umbrella-like restriction on one
type of corporate transaction.
FTL, however, recognizes a particular time when one party - namely,
creditors - are entitled to protection beyond what they negotiate for themselves
through contract. In this peculiar intersection of a large corporate transaction
and a particular piece of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has found it
warranted to interfere with market forces. If we accept that failed LBOs get this
special kind of attention after the fact of failure, then perhaps it makes sense to
impose a limited check on the market before the fact. Externalities justify
regulation, and the externalities of LBOs, in which shareholders extract value
from creditors, are abundantly clear. Contractual solutions have failed to solve
the problem of wealth-extracting LBOs, and FTL already recognizes as much.
Further, the existence of FTL as codified in § 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code create a convenient opportunity to provide a system of review without
the regulatory authority required to mandate review. Without these provisions,
a system of ex ante review seems a mammoth undertaking and unlikely
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E. Bad Faith Objections and Disclosure Timing
The proposed procedure does increase the amount of time the LBO is in
negotiation, and the purchasers and lenders may worry that the review process
would be subject to abuse by other interested purchasers. For example, a
competitive bidder may find a way to use the objection and review process to
hold up the original bidder's deal and to get a peek at the intricacies of the
proposed transaction, the better to marginally best the offer currently on
the table.
But friendly bidders making tender offers or structuring mergers face the
same issue. Parties to these deals find ways to ward off competitive bidders
using exclusive dealing and good-faith negotiation arrangements.'66 Under the
proposed regime, for example, the purchaser, lender, and target company
could finalize and commit to the LBO deal-subject to the approval of ex ante
review-before sending notice out to the target's creditors and before
undergoing the process of review.
The process of ex ante review should also be timed appropriately late in the
process in order to guard against the possibility that changes in the target's
financial condition occurring after review but before finalization render the
findings of the review inaccurate. In In re O'Day Corp., for example, the court
rejected the projections of the target's future cash flows because they were
based on long-range historical data and did not incorporate a downturn in
profits that occurred shortly before the buyout.16 7
F. Risk Externalities and Imperfect Adjusters
The most forceful criticisms of ex ante approval of LBOs are likely to come
from those eager to protect creditors and skeptical of LBOs generally. In the
long debate over whether FTL should be applied at all to LBOs,168 one of the
strongest justifications for its use is that an LBO creates risk externalities
166. WILuAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GuHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES
ON THE LAw oF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 577 (4th ed. 2012).
167. 126 B.R. 370, 405 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
168. See generally William C. Rand, In re Kaiser Steel Corporation: Does Section 546(e) of the
Bankruptcy Code Apply to a Fraudulent Conveyance Made in the Form of an LBO Payment?, i9
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 86 (1991) (exploring whether or not 5 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which precludes the application of FTL to settlement payments made to certain financial
parties, should apply to LBO payments); Sabino, supra note 66 (analyzing the schism
between courts that have applied FTL to LBOs and scholars who have opposed such
application); White, supra note 38 (exploring the technical applicability of FTL to LBOs).
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within the firm. 6' An LBO shifts risk from selling shareholders to current and
future creditors, as well as to firm employees impacted by the firm's increased
risk of bankruptcy. 7o When external parties can adjust to the increased risk-
by charging higher interest rates, for example - there is little policy reason for
policing the risk-shifting, unless that adjustment process involved high
transaction costs. In the case of LBOs, however, a number of the parties with
increased risk cannot adjust for it: existing creditors, employees, and future
involuntary creditors (e.g., tort victims or tax authorities). The three-pronged
criteria of FTL attempt to protect these imperfect adjusters with a minimal
cushion shielding against bankruptcy. Giving the green light ex ante and
shielding negotiating parties against later fraudulent transfer litigation limits
these protections. It provides a mechanism by which creditors give up their
future litigation rights and thus limits the bargaining tools that creditors have
in any pre-LBO negotiations. In the case of ex ante review, under which
creditors have an opportunity to litigate against the financial projections used
to approve the LBO, the creditors of an ailing company who are desperate for a
fix, even a risky one, may be coerced out of objecting.
The answer to this set of objections is that a process of ex ante review does
not generally tip the scales in favor of the target and lenders and against the
creditors. That is, it should not make it easier for LBO participants to extract
value from creditors through an overly-risky transaction -and that is because
of the review's discriminatory effect on likely-to-pass and likely-to-fail LBOs.
By imposing an extra layer of scrutiny on an LBO before it proceeds, LBO
participants looking merely to extract value may be less inclined to propose the
transaction in the first place. And those who do will be ferreted out by the
process of external review. If the ex ante review spurs pre-transaction
negotiations between interested parties, it can increase only the number of
Pareto-efficient LBOs and decrease the number of overly-risky or wealth-
destroying transactions.
CONCLUSION
The current regime of constructive fraudulent transfer litigation suffers
from problems of hindsight bias and inadequate remedy, adds great
uncertainty to potential transactions, and creates poor monitoring incentives
regarding buyouts. The solution proposed in this Note attempts to remedy
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many of these difficulties. The strength of this proposal turns on its ability to
do what the current regime does not: distinguish between different types of
LBOs. Ex ante review of LBOs makes likely-to-pass or "good" LBOs safer for
the parties involved, while making likely-to-fail or "bad" LBOs tougher to
execute in the first place. With such ex ante review in place, any ex post
litigation over LBOs would turn not on a second-guessing of projections made
at the time of the transaction, but on the completeness and honesty of the
target's disclosure of its financials-a question much better suited to ex post
analysis than are questions of valuation.
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